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This article assessed the challenges posed by the use of digital signatures as part of  
the introduction of an electronic transfer of land ownership system. The role and  
function of manuscript signatures is analysed in order to explain the role that digit-
al signatures will play in a system which allows for the electronic transfer of land  
ownership. The technological and legal initiatives relating to digital signatures are  
analysed. In particular, the development of a legal framework for digital signatures  
is evaluated. This article focuses on whether the form of digital signature that is  
provided by the Electronic Signatures Directive and the UNICTRAL Model Law  
on Electronic Signatures is appropriate in the context of the electronic transfer of  
land ownership. Electronic conveyancing will transform the current paper-based  
conveyancing system. Digital signatures will play a vital role in this process. The  
affect that the introduction of digital signatures will have on the conveyancing pro-
cess has not been addressed. This research evaluates how liability for fraudulent  
transactions will be distributed in an electronic conveyancing process which relies  
on digital signatures.
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Digital  Signatures,  Electronic  Conveyancing,  Electronic  Signatures  Directive,  
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures
1. INTRODUCTION
The process of transferring ownership of land from one person to another 
has evolved over several hundred years. In common law jurisdictions such 
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as Ireland this process, known as conveyancing is ‘creaking at the seams’1 
and ‘is  hampered by a complex,  cumbersome legislative  framework and 
thus inherent delay’.2 Applying electronic commerce principles to the con-
veyancing process has been described as obvious.3 The focus of this article is 
to assess the challenges that the use of digital signatures present in the con-
text of transferring land ownership.
2. THE FORM AND FUNCTION OF SIGNATURES
The common law and legislation relating to signatures and their use in con-
veyancing  has evolved as  innovations  in  technology have occurred.  The 
universally understood concept of the signature is known as the manuscript 
or wet signature and usually takes the form of hand writing on a paper car-
rier. However, exceptions and modifications to this concept of the signature 
have  been  made  by  common  law courts.  These  include  crosses,  initials, 
pseudonyms, identifying phrases, printed names and rubber stamps. 
The formal requirements for the creation of a valid will are analogous to 
the requirement for a valid contract for the sale of land. Wills are required 
to be in writing,  signed by the testator and attested by at least two wit-
nesses.4 These formalities are of relevance to our understanding of digital 
signatures as common law courts have focused on the intention of the test-
ator rather than the form of signature.
In the Estate of Cook, Deceased5 a will singed with the words, ‘your loving 
mother’ was regarded the held to be validly executed. Similarly in Scotland, 
the decision of the Outer House of the Court of Session,  Rhodes v Peterson6 
Lord Hunter held that the words ‘lots of love, mum’ could be construed as a 
valid signature.
In Fulton v Kee,7 the Court of Appeal, Civil Division of Northern Ireland 
dealt with a similar set of facts. The testator suffered from a medical condi-
tion which made it impossible to sign the will. The witnesses assisted the 
1 Law Society of Ireland eConveyancing Task Force 2008 ‘e-Conveyancing: back to Basic Prin-
ciples’ <http://www.tfpb.ie/Publication%20of%20eVision.pdf> viewed 14 January 2013.
2 Ibid.
3 Law Reform Commission 2006, ‘’Report: eConveyancing: Modelling of the Irish Conveyan-
cing System’ LRC 79-2006, para 2.06.
4 S.78 Succession Act 1965 (Ireland)
5 [1960] 1 Weekly Law Reports 353.
6 Rhodes v Peterson (1972) Scots Law Times 98.
7 Fulton v Kee [1961] Northern Ireland Law Reports 1. See also - - ‘The Execution of a Will by a 
Marksman’, (1960-1961) 14 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 399.
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testator by placing the pen between his figures and making the mark. Lord 
MacDermott found that a mark made with the necessary intent will be suffi-
cient.8
These decisions indicate that in a more modern context, a person who 
chooses to use a more advanced form of signature such as a typed signature 
could validly execute a will once the required intention and physical act are 
present.  
The creation of a valid contract for land is subject to special rules. S.2 
Statute of Frauds (Ireland) 1695 required the contract to be evidenced in 
writing.9 The formalities imposed on those obtaining an interest in land can 
be justified on a number of grounds; the protection of vulnerable parties,  
the prevention of fraud and perjury and promoting certainty. The purpose 
of this statute was the ‘prevention of many fraudulent practices which are com-
monly endeavoured to be upheld by perjury and subornation of perjury’.10
The modern judicial approach is to recognise the function of a signature 
over the form. Professor Reed has written ‘a signature will be valid, irre-
spective of the form it takes, if it performs the functions which the law re-
quires of a signature’.11 A constant theme in the evolution of signatures has 
been the need to ensure that the identity and intention of executor is evid-
enced.
3. DIGITAL SIGNATURES – LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
While digital signatures have emerged relatively recently, the concept of di-
gital signatures has existed in law since the 1990s. The UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Electronic Commerce (MLEC) and Model Law on Electronic Signa-
tures  (MLES) were  enacted to provide guidance  to national  states  when 
drafting legislation to provide for electronic commerce. The MLEC intro-
duced the concept of functional equivalence and provides that a document 
in paper form and a document in digital form would be given the same re-
cognition.12 Providing that a document can be read by all can remain un-
8 Baker v Dening (1838) 8 Adolphus and Ellis Reports 94.
9 See Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009, S.51.
10 Ibid, preamble.
11 Chris Reed, 'What is a Signature?’ (2000) 3 The Journal of Information, Law and Techno-
logy. <http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2000_3/reed/> viewed 28 July 2012.
12 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, Part I, Chapter 2Article 5
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altered over time and can allow for authentication by signature and can be 
reproduced over time it will be the equivalent of a paper document.13
Article 7 provides that where legislation requires the signature of a per-
son, this requirement will be met where a method is used to identity the sig-
natory and to indicate their approval of the contents of the electronic docu-
ment.14 The Model Law on Electronic  Signatures (MLES) expands on the 
principles contained in Article 7 of the MLEC and focuses on two functions 
of a signature; identifying the signatory to a document and confirming that 
the signatory approved of the contents.
Article 2(a) MLES requires that the signatory be identifiable through the 
electronic signature. The connection between the signatory and the signa-
ture is maintained by a certificate. Article 2(b) defines a certificate as a ‘data 
message of other record confirming the link between a signatory and signa-
ture creation data’.15 In practice this link would be created when the signat-
ory applies for a certificate from a certification provider. Such a certificate 
could take the form of a cryptographic  verification key.  The certification 
provider is defined in Article 2(e) as a person who issues certificate relating 
to electronic signatures.  
Article 6 of the MLES contains the core principles of the model law and 
develops the principles set out in Article 7 of the MLEC.  An electronic sig-
nature is considered reliable where the signature creation data and the sig-
natory are uniquely linked;16 where the signatory and the electronic signa-
ture are uniquely linked at the time of execution17 and when any alteration 
post execution is detectable.18 The purpose of this article is to ensure that 
any ‘legal consequence would have flowed from the use of a handwritten 
signature; the same consequence should flow from the use of a reliable elec-
tronic signature’.19 The MLES sets a high standard, particularly in Article 6 
where not only should the electronic signature and the signatory be linked, 
but the electronic signature must be under the control of the signatory at the 
time of execution and no one else. However, while this is a high standard it 
is also warranted as in order to provide for functional equivalence, the tool 
13 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, Part B, para 16
14 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, Part I, Chapter 2, Article 7.
15 Ibid, Article 2(d).  
16 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures, Part II, Article 6(a).
17 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures, Part II, Article 6(b).
18 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures, Part II, Article 6(c).
19 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures – Guide to Enactment, para 115.
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used for signing, whether it is a fountain pen or a cryptographic digital sig-
nature must under the exclusive control of the signatory at the time of exe-
cution.  
The increase in internet usage and electronic commerce from the 1990s 
prompted the European Union to prepare a European framework for digital 
signatures and encryption. In 1996 the European parliament passed a resol-
ution requesting the Commission to prepare measures to ensure the integ-
rity and authenticity  of  electronically  transmitted documents.20 The Elec-
tronic Signatures Directive21 was the result of this process.  The Electronic 
Signatures Directive (ESD) reflects the principles set out in the MLEC and 
the MLES. 
However, the ESD differs from the MLEC and the MLES as it provides 
for three forms of electronic signature; the basic electronic signature, an ad-
vanced Electronic Signature (AES) and an AES with a qualified certificate 
which is described as a qualified electronic signature (QES). While the ESD 
is technologically neutral, the EU Commission has recognised that in prac-
tice the definitions provided are based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).22
Article 2(1) of the ESD defines an electronic signature as being ‘data in 
electronic form which are attached to or logically associated with other elec-
tronic  data  and which  serve as  a method of  authentication’.  Article  2(2) 
provides for an AES. The definition of an AES is similar to the electronic 
signature set out in the MLES. The ESD provides that an AES must meet the 
following requirements; be uniquely linked with the signatory;23 be capable 
of identifying the signatory;24 be controlled exclusively by the signatory25 
and linked to the electronic document in such a way that any alteration post 
execution is detectable.26
The AES does not explicitly require that the signatory acknowledge the 
contents of the electronic document although as Article 2(1) provides that 
the signature is either attached to or embedded in the electronic document 
this would be implied. 
20 European Parliament Resolution A4-244-96 of 10.09.96
21 Council Directive (EC) 99/93 on a Community framework for electronic signatures [1999] OJ 
L013/12 (Electronic Signatures Directive).
22 Commission, 'Report on the operation of Directive 1999/93/EC on a Community framework 
for electronic signatures' COM (2006) 120 final, 4.
23 Ibid, Article 2(2) (a).
24 Ibid, Article 2(2) (b).
25 Ibid, Article 2(2) (c).
26 Ibid, Article 2(2) (d).
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Arguably the standard required by the AES is overly elaborate for many 
consumer contracts. The AES does comply with the concept of functional 
equivalence as the AES must be uniquely linked to the signatory and be 
controlled exclusively by the signatory. Mason has commented that this re-
quirement displays a bias towards cryptographic tokens such as smart ID 
cards.27 He has argued that it is unlikely for an individual to remember a 
private  key  as  it  is  too  complex  and  tokens  containing  the  private  key 
would be required. A token may take the form of a diskette, smart card or 
an encrypted memory stick. It is clear that as such token can be removed 
from or lost by the signatory and cannot be uniquely linked to the signat-
ory.  It  is  likely that  a private key which is  created using biometric  data 
would be the only form of private key that could be uniquely linked to the 
signatory.
The AES also requires a link to the electronic document which would al-
low for the detection of any alterations. This would suggest the use of PKI 
which could lock a document, preventing further amendments. 
The intention was that an AES would, when coupled with a qualified 
certificate from a certificate provider, offer the highest level of security. An 
AES based on a qualified certificate was described in the ESD as a QES.28 
The qualified certificate which is the main difference between a QES and an 
AES would be issued by a certification service  provider (CSP).  The CSP 
would certify the authenticity of the signatory’s public key, which would 
verify the identity of the holder of the AES applied to the electronic docu-
ment.29
The QES is intended to offer full functional equivalence to a manuscript 
signature. In 2008 the Commission restated the principle that a QES benefits 
from a presumption of functional equivalence to a manuscript signature un-
der the ESD.30 However, it is important to note the intention of the ESD in 
respect of the QES. The Commission was aware of the trend in Europe to 
develop electronic identity cards (EID) and it is arguable that the QES re-
flects a view that EID would play a significant role ‘as an identification docu-
27 Mason, S, 2012, Electronic Signatures in Law, 3rd edition, Cambridge University Press, para 
4.3 and 4.7.
28 Commission, ‘Action Plan on e-signatures and e-identification to facilitate the provision of  
crossborder public services in the Single Market’, COM (2008) 798 final, 6.
29 The certificate may take many technical forms and contain information on the expiry date of 
the electronic signature.  In practice recipient’s computer application will verify the authen-
ticity of the signature used.
30 Ibid, 7.
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ment and to provide on-line access to public services for the citizens. In most cases  
these ID cards will contain the three functionalities: identification, authentication  
and signing’.31
The ESD unlike the MLES does not impose obligations on a party relying 
on a certificate to ensure that it is valid and to verify that the identity of the  
subscribers is one and the same as the person possessing the certificate. In-
stead the ESD sets out a list of recommendations for security verification.32
The UNCITRAL model laws and the ESD provide for digital signatures. 
Given the formalities which are required by current conveyancing proced-
ures, it is likely that only the QES is appropriate in an electronic conveyan-
cing system.  Such digital signatures will rely on PKI technology. The ESD 
allows Member States to decide on the level of electronic signature that is  
suitable for different types of contracts. However, the QES as understood by 
the Commission suggests that EID cards are required to give full effect to 
the intention of the ESD. Certainly, transactions involving land require a 
signature that is entirely the functional equivalent of a manuscript signature 
and it is logical an EID card would play an integral role in such a system. In  
addition, the standards for the QES in respect of the degree of control and 
the unique link that the signature is to have with the person to whom it is 
vested are quite high. This standard is necessary if the QES is to be truly the 
functional equivalent of a manuscript signature.
4. DIGITAL SIGNATURES – TECHNOLOGICAL 
BACKGROUND
A digital signature is data affixed to or a cryptographic transformation of a 
data unit which allows the recipient to prove the source and integrity of the 
data unit.33 The Interoperable Delivery of European eGovernment Services 
to public Administrations, Businesses and Citizens (IDABC) project defines 
a digital signature as being ‘a digitised analogy of a written signature, produced  
by a cryptographic procedure acting (commonly) on a digest of the message to be  
signed’.34
31 Commission, 'Report on the operation of Directive 1999/93/EC on a Community framework 
for electronic signatures' COM (2006) 120 final, 6.
32 Ibid, Annex IV.
33 Mason, S, 2012, Electronic Signatures in Law, 3rd edition, Cambridge University Press, para 
10.4.
34 Interoperable Delivery of European eGovernment Services to public Administrations, Busi-
nesses  and  Citizens  (IDABC),  'Glossary  -  Digital  Signatures' 
<http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/en/document/652/5892.html> viewed 14 January 2013.
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While an electronic signature can take many forms, such as the typed 
name at the end of an email, a digital signature is the product of a mathem-
atical equation known as an algorithm. An algorithm applies cryptography 
to conceal data disguising the plaintext message so that the message has no 
ordinary meaning. In practice the plaintext message is converted into an un-
intelligible alphanumeric text. 
Cryptography can perform a number of roles that are relevant in an elec-
tronic conveyancing context. It can ensure the authenticity of the message, 
the integrity of the message, the confidentiality of the message and can pre-
vent alterations to the message. In order to understand how a document can 
be signed electronically,  it  is  necessary to understand how cryptography 
works.
There are two types of encryption; asymmetric and symmetric crypto-
graphic systems. Symmetric cryptographic systems are conventional in that 
the data is  encrypted using one encryption key and decrypted using the 
same key. Both the sender and recipient must agree on the key which is to 
be used to encrypt. This system is limited to use by trusted groups of users 
such as the government and the military. In such groups the key must be 
publically available to all. As such, the key cannot be distributed over an 
unsecure network if the authenticity and integrity of the message is to be re-
tained.
Asymmetric  cryptographic  systems  address  the  disadvantages  with 
symmetric cryptographic systems. There are two keys in an asymmetric sys-
tem; the public key and private key and the system is known as Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI). The public key is used to encrypt the data and is avail-
able to the world at large while the private key is controlled by the parties.  
The private key algorithm is applied to the plaintext.  This private key al-
gorithm is also known as a hash function.35 The private key algorithm is ap-
plied to the document to be signed and secondly it is applied to the signa-
ture of the individual or entity signing the document.36 Once the plaintext is 
encrypted  a  computer  application  will  derive  an  alphanumeric  number 
from the encrypted data. This is known as the ‘hash result’ and once it is at-
tached to the original message it becomes the digital signature.37 
35 Tupper, S, 2000 'From Seal to Cyber-Notary Uncertainty in Electronic Commerce and the 
Case for a Digital Signature Law in Michigan' 45 Wayne Law Rev. 237 (1999-2000), 256.
36 Mason, S & Bohm, N, 2003, 'The signature in electronic conveyancing: an unresolved issue?' 
(2003) Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 460.
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The recipient of a message encrypted using asymmetric encryption can 
verify that that the message did come from the sender and that it has not 
been altered since being sent by the use of a public key. The public key is  
obtained from a certification provider. The recipient’s computer, using the 
public  key  checks  the  hash  result  against  the  digital  signature  on  the 
sender's message. If the hash result matches the digital signature, the recipi-
ent can accept prime facie that the message is authentic, was not altered since 
being sent and was signed by the party who clams to have signed it. If the 
recipient is required to sign the document also, which is the case with some 
deeds involving land where both parties are prejudiced in some manner; 
the recipient repeats the above process using their private key. 
Parties may create their own public and private keys. However, no mat-
ter how secure these keys are, a third party will insist on independent veri-
fication of the authenticity and integrity of the message. Therefore, an inde-
pendent certification authority is required. The certification authority will 
issue the public  key which would enable either  party wish to verify  the 
transaction. 
The certificate is proof of the public key being associated with the sender 
and when taken in conjunction with the digital signature and hash function, 
it would be sufficient proof of intention to satisfy conveyancing law require-
ments.38
The complexity of the encryption algorithms are such that an individual 
would not be able to commit them to memory. As a result a private key 
would need to take the form of a token. However, control of the private key 
is an issue. Mason has noted that ’the greater the security of the mechanism does  
not, in fact, offer the subscribing party any protection against attacks, such as the  
theft of a key of the corruption of a terminal’.39
In addition,40 if the private key is not uniquely linked with the signatory 
as it may be removed from or lost by the subscribers with relative ease. A 
smart card with the private key in an embedded chip could, if combined 
with additional security features, provide a higher level of authentication.  
Such  a  system could  involve  the  holder  of  a  smart  card  containing  the 
37 Tupper, S, 2000 'From Seal to Cyber-Notary Uncertainty in Electronic Commerce and the 
Case for a Digital Signature Law in Michigan' 45 Wayne Law Rev. 237 (1999-2000), 256.
38 Ibid, 258.
39 Mason, S, 2012, Electronic Signatures in Law, 3rd edition, Cambridge University Press, para 
15.10.
40 See para 4.28 supra.
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private key validating the private key using a card reader which would be 
connected through the internet to the certification provider. The holder of 
the smart card would be required to enter a personal identification number 
to enable the card. Alternatively the private key could be contained on a 
USB memory stick. 
The future of digital signatures lies with digital identity cards containing 
biometric data and PKI. Research conducted on behalf of the digital identity 
card industry predicts that the number of electronic identity cards will ex-
ceed traditional  identity cards by 2015.41 Sweden recently began to intro-
duce digital identity cards that will contain the holder’s photograph, finger-
prints and electronic signature. This data will be gathered by a private com-
pany through enrollment kiosks which will enable instant capture.42
Emerging economies have embraced digital identity cards which incor-
porate biometric data. The Indian government launched the unique identity 
scheme (UID) in  2010.43 The UID will  involve the gathering of biometric 
data from 1.2 billion citizens and is the largest biometric identity scheme in 
the world. Each digital identity card will include the personal and demo-
graphic details of the resident and will be associated with their iris and fin-
gerprint biometric information. Biometric identifiers are used to generate a 
unique identifier number (UIN). When citizens need to authenticate their 
identity, they must provide their UIN and biometric data, which is verified 
using data held.44 Biometrics offers the advantage of a strong link to the sig-
natory and can authenticate an individual in the physical domain.45
The  Estonian  government  has  championed  sustainable  development 
through technology.  Digital identity cards, which are not obligatory, con-
tain a digital signature. In addition, each holder of a digital identity card re-
ceives an official e-mail address which is intended for use official corres-
pondence with government authorities and is recognized as the citizen's of-
41 Acuity  Market  Intelligence,  The  Global  National  eID  Industry  Report’  (2010) 
<http://www.acuity-mi.com/GNeID_Report.php> viewed 14 January 2013.
42 Gemalto,  'Sweden  Renews  Multi-Year  Contract  on  ePassports  and  eID  Cards  with  AB 
Svenska Pass,  a  Gemalto  Company'  <http://www.gemalto.com/php/pr_view.php?id=973> 
viewed 14 January 2013.
43 The Economist, ‘Reform by numbers’ (London, 14 January 2012) <http://www.economist.-
com/node/21542814> viewed 29 July 2012. See also The Economist, ‘India’s identity scheme: 
The magic number’ (London, 14 January 2012) <http://www.economist.com/node/21542763> 
viewed 14 January 2013.
44 Gemalto  'eID  in  India'  <http://www.gemalto.com/digital_identity/india.html>  viewed  14 
January 2013.
45 Pope, N, 2005 'Practical considerations in securing electronic signatures'  Digital Evidence 
and Electronic Signature Law Review, vol. 2, p. 67.
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ficial electronic residence.46 In Lithuania an electronic conveyancing system 
is being developed where biometric information will be integrated with a 
digital signature to identify notaries.47 These initiatives are seen as being in 
line with a broader European trend, which aims to integrate eGoverment 
services and identity cards.48
Technology has provided viable  alternatives  to  the manuscript  signa-
ture. Jurisprudence has focused on the function of the signature: to show in-
tention  and  authenticate  identity.  This  standard  can  only  be  fully  met 
though the use of tokens such as smart cards which contain the required 
private keys and which are uniquely linked to and are under the sole con-
trol of the signatory. The use of biometric data to link the signatory and the  
smart card would satisfy the legislative requirements. 
5. CONCLUSIONS
The jurisprudence relating to signatures illustrates that the role of a signa-
ture in evidencing intention and identity are key functions. Therefore, the 
form of the signature is irrelevant so long as the signature can be used to 
show the intention and identity of the signatory. 
Conveyancing must be distinguished from common consumer contracts 
such as purchasing an airline ticket online. For most of society the purchase 
of a house is the most expensive transaction that they ever enter into.  The 
formalities relating to the execution of deeds of transfer or conveyances or 
mortgages are justified on consumer protection grounds and the ‘prevention  
of many fraudulent practices which are commonly endeavoured to be upheld by per-
jury and subornation of perjury’.49
Therefore,  the  introduction  of  electronic  conveyancing  offers  the  pro-
spect of making the conveyancing process much more efficient  by trans-
forming it into a paperless system. 
The definition of the Qualified Electronic Signature (QES) provided in 
the ESD was apparently technologically neutral, but in practice favors PKI 
technology contained on tokens such as smart cards.  As previously noted, 
46 AS Sertifitseerimiskeskushttp (Estonian State Certification Centre), 'The Estonian ID Card 
and Digital Signature Concept: Principles and Solutions', p 7. <www.id.ee/public/The_Esto-
nian_ID_Card_and_Digital_Signature_Concept.pdf> viewed 14 January 2013.
47 Stitlis, D Petrauskas, R & Rotomskis, I, 2006  'Implementation of Public E-Services for Im-
movable Property Contracts in Lithuania' Digital  Evidence and Electronic Signature Law 
Review , vol 3, p 82.
48 Ibid.
49 Statute of Frauds (Ireland) 1695, preamble.
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the ESD requires that the QES be uniquely linked with the signatory;50 be 
capable of identifying the signatory51 and can be controlled exclusively by 
the signatory.52 It appears that not only does the ESD suggest the use of PKI 
smart cards, but that the smart cards were to take the form of an Electronic 
Identity Card (EID). 
This  understanding  of the QES has been accepted in  some European 
countries.53 However, there is a lack of case law on the ESD which addresses 
this issue.54 In addition there is  ‘currently no natural market demand for 
Qualified Certificates and related services’.55 Examples of PKI systems that 
meet  the  high  standards  required  in  an  electronic  conveyancing  context 
have not  been  introduced.  As a  result,  the  form that  a  digital  signature 
should take in an electronic conveyancing system is far from clear.
It is important to note that the ESD merely obliges Member States to en-
sure that a QES is given the same legal status as a handwritten signature. 
The ESD does not regulate the legal use and consequences of a handwritten 
signature itself, and not the legal consequences of the QES.56 As such, policy 
makers will  need to consider  whether a digital  signature contained on a 
smart card will meet the requirements for a QES. 
If policy makers introduce an electronic conveyancing system which re-
lies on a form of QES that is not uniquely linked to and under the sole con-
trol of the holder, it is possible that the use of such a digital signature could 
be challenged on the basis that the form of digital signature used did not 
meet the standards required by the ESD. 
These standards; the requirement for a signatory to be uniquely linked to 
the smart card and for that card to be under the signatory’s sole control can 
in practice only be satisfied by an EID or another form of smart card that of-
fers a quick and effective means of linking the holder and the card. Member 
states have a wide discretion in respect of the method used to link the sig-
natory and the smart card. However, as can be seen, the trend in some EU 
states such as Sweden, Estonia and Holland is to include within EID a digit-
50 Electronic Signatures Directive Article 2(2) (a).
51 Ibid, Article 2(2) (b).
52 Ibid, Article 2(2) (c).
53 Pope, N, 2005 'Practical considerations in securing electronic signatures' Digital Evidence 
and Electronic Signature Law Review , vol. 2, p67.
54 Kelm, S, 2005  'On the implementation of the 1999 European Directive on electronic signa-
tures' Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review , vol. 2 p. 9.
55 Ibid, p.10.
56 Ibid, p. 9.
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al signature and biometric identifiers that would enable the person presen-
ted with such a card to verify that the holder of the card is one and the same 
as the person who is entitled to use the digital signature contained on it. 
The conveyancing process requires a form of digital signature which is 
both legally and technically the equivalent of a manuscript signature. The 
definitions and principles provided in the ESD foresee a form of digital sig-
nature uniquely linked to and under the sole control of the signatory. While 
there is an understanding of digital signatures in a legal and technical con-
text, the practical implementation of these requirements has not been ad-
dressed. Therefore, legislators will need to ensure that the digital signature 
model introduced is one that can conclusively link the signatory with the di-
gital signature contained on a smart card or token. This requirement could 
be met by the introduction of a smart card which provides a means of con-
clusively verifying that the person presenting the card is entitled to use the 
digital signature contained in the card.  While this may be seen as impractic-
al due to cost implications and other factors, it is necessary that the form of 
digital signature to be used in the electronic conveyancing process remains 
faithful to the function of the manuscript signature.
